

On a Less Known Nash Equilibrium Uniqueness Result

CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS

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Corrections:

1. *Page 69, line 17* ↓: $\mathbf{x} = (x^i; \mathbf{x}^i)$. We denote ...
2. *Page 69, line 17* ↑: ... then $I^\circ = (-3, 1)$,
3. *Page 69, line 16* ↑: $I_- = (-3, 1)$, and ...
4. *Page 70, line 9* ↑: ... $\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}_-^i(x_*^i, \varphi^i(\mathbf{x}_*)) < \dots$
5. *Page 72, line 11* ↑: condition 2 in Theorem 1 by the following less technical but stronger one:
6. *Page 72, line 9* ↑: ... one has: $a > b \Rightarrow \dots$
7. *Page 72, lines 6, 7* ↑: omit these lines
8. *Page 73, line 9* ↑: $Y' = Y$, that ...
9. *Page 73, line 2* ↑: is sufficient that $\frac{\partial^2 \pi^i}{\partial x^{i2}} + \frac{\partial^2 \pi^i}{\partial x^i \partial y} < 0$, and for ...
10. *Page 76, line 6* ↑: ... := $\mathcal{P}^i(x^i) - \mathcal{D}^i(\sum_{l=1}^N T_{il}x^l)$

Comments:

Further reading:

P. H. M. von Mouche (2011). On Games with Constant Nash Sum. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Volume IV, 294-310. Editors: L. Petrosjan, N. Zenkevich. Graduate School of Management St. Petersburg. ISBN 978-5-9924-0069-4.

M. Finus, P. H. M. von Mouche and B. Rundshagen (2014), On Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Volume VII, 51-60. Editors: L. Petrosjan, N. Zenkevich. St. Petersburg State University. ISSN 2310-2608.

If you think that some other things should be added here, then please let me know.